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Abstract 
This paper uses the Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey data for the years 1999, 
2002 and 2005 to investigate business tax evasion in 24 transition economies. We use both conventional 
fixed effects estimation and the recently developed Fixed Effect Vector Decomposition approach. The 
most robust finding in our study is the importance of institutional factors. In particular, higher levels of 
corruption related to tax administration and slower transition reforms substantially reduce the amount of 
taxes paid by businesses in transition economies. In addition, we find a positive relationship between 
evasion and tax rate; and identify minor effects of the macroeconomic environment. We also find that 
social norms play a significant role in tax evasion. These findings inform policy recommendations 
intended to reduce either the possibility and/or the inclination to evade. 
JEL Classification: H25, H26, H32, P20 
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1. Introduction 
With taxes comes evasion (Cowell, 1990). Tax evasion imposes economic costs: it 
slows down economic growth by weakening the government’s ability to provide 
adequate public goods (Johnson et al., 2000); it diverts resources to unproductive 
activities such as establishing financial subsidiaries to cover-up evasion (Slemrod, 2007); 
it provides an incentive for firms to remain small and invisible to facilitate evasion, 
thereby missing opportunities from the formal economy (Nur-tegin, 2008); and it 
generates inequity between the evaders and the honest taxpayers by shifting the burden 
to the latter group, thereby creating an incentive for further evasion (Feinstein, 1991).  
Tax evasion is one of the major problems facing developing (Fuest and Riedel, 
2009) and transition economies (Pirttila, 1999). The literature on the factors shaping tax 
evasion is fairly well developed (reviews include: Jackson and Milliron, 1986; Cowell, 
1990; Andreoni, et al., 1998; Franzoni, 2008; Torgler 2011). However, most of it relates 
to individuals.  
The lack of research on tax evasion by businesses is unfortunate, especially given 
the fact that in most countries the bulk of taxes is paid by firms and firms account for 
the bulk of tax evasion too (McCaffery and Slemrod, 2004; Crocker and Slemrod, 2005; 
Chang and Lai, 2004, Nur-tegin, 2008). Moreover, as suggested by Andreoni et al (1998) 
there is a huge gap and thus a permanent need for international and cross country 
research on tax evasion; while the work in the context of transition countries is still less 
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developed. This paper aims to reduce this gap by introducing some empirical findings 
for businesses, cross-country and transition features of tax evasion.  
The starting assumption in our work is similar to the assumption made generally 
in the current literature on the tax behaviour of businesses, which is that the behaviour 
of businesses is similar to the behaviour of individuals, and that – as a corollary – the 
determinants of business tax evasion may be similar, at least qualitatively, to the 
determinants of tax evasion by individuals or households.4 As Slemrod (2007, p.36) 
points out, the literature on business tax evasion “adapts the theory of tax evasion, which for 
the most part concerns individual decision makers, to the tax compliance decisions made by businesses”. 
So far, cross-country investigations on tax evasion are rare. Through this paper we 
want to build upon pioneering work of cross-country investigation in Riahl-Belkaoiu 
(2004) and Richardson (2006) who have analysed individual tax evasion in respectively 
30 and 45 countries. Riahl-Belkaoiu (2004) examines the international differences in tax 
evasion and relates these differences to selected determinants of tax morale. His 
findings show that tax evasion is lowest in countries characterized by high economic 
freedom, a developed equity market, effective competition laws and a low serious crime 
rate.  
Richardson (2006) on the other hand advances cross-country investigation of 
individual tax evasion using a larger sample and finds that non-economic determinants 
have the strongest impact on tax evasion in comparison with economic determinants; 
most notably, the complexity of the tax system, education, income source, fairness and 
tax morale are highly correlated with tax compliant behaviour. We extend their (cross-
country) approach by focusing on business instead of individual tax evasion and by 
focusing only on transition countries.5  
Firm level analysis using BEEPS data have been also conducted previously by 
Nur-tegin (2008) Joulfaian (2009) and Abdixhiku et al. (2016). In addition to Riahl-
Belkaoiu (2004) and Richardson (2006), we build upon the work of Nur-tegin, (2008), 
Joulfaian (2009) and Alon and Hageman (2012) by first, introducing new – and, so far, 
unobserved – determinants to the tax compliance model given the aggregation of micro 
data from various non-BEEPS sources; and second, by increasing the time period of 
dataset to three years (as compared to one in the past studies).  
In a very recent publication, Alm, Martinez-Vazquez and McClellan (2016) also 
investigate the relationship between corruption and tax evasion – i.e. on ‘how the 
potential for bribery of tax officials affects a firm’s tax evasion decision’. They develop a 
new theoretical model of firms reporting when bribery is an option. Our cross-country 
                                                 
4 However, we must note that, there is a growing literature that highlights mostly theoretically that firm 
tax evasion may differ in various aspects from income tax evasion in its determinates and consequences 
(e.g. Chen and Chu, 2005; Crocker and Slemrod 2005; Goerke and Runkel 2006; Seidel and Thum 2016; 
Marjit et. al. 2017; Goerke 2017). Furthermore, there exists a substantial mostly empirical literature on 
profit shifting (Dischinger and Riedel, 2011; Dharmapala and Riedel, 2013).  
5 Williams and Martinez (2007) conduct an exploratory analysis of individual tax morale and cross-country 
variations in the European Union. We note that studies on individual tax morale – in addition to 
individual tax evasion - have been extensive (see Torgler 2011 for a review). Business tax morale, on the 
other hand, has been neglected by researchers given the lack of data availability for most of the 
countries (Torgler, 2007). Though understanding the determinants of intrinsic motivation of individuals 
to comply – i.e. tax morale – has been always important in understanding a part of tax evasion 
behaviour, this paper focuses on a broader picture, that is, on determinants of business tax evasion in a 
cross-country context.  
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panel investigation, instead, uses the traditional model – and focuses on a wider range of 
determinants of tax evasion that go beyond the causal relationship between tax evasion 
and corruption related to tax administration. In our work, we focus on macroeconomic 
factors (GDP per capita, unemployment, inflation, non-performing loans); institutions 
(corruption and institutional development); and socio-cultural differences (social norms 
and education). Furthermore, when treating corruption in tax administration as a 
control variable for tax evasion,6 we come to similar results as in Alm, Martinez-
Vazquez & McClellan (2016)- that the likelihood of the decision to evade increases in 
countries where there is corruption in tax administration and that the possibility of 
bribing the tax administration officials affects business decision to evade. 
Specifically, this paper contributes to the literature by using the data for the years 
1999, 2002 and 2005 to investigate business tax evasion in 24 transition economies. In 
our study, we incorporate institutional and macroeconomic indicators alongside tax rate 
and cultural influences on business evasion in transition economies.  
To analyse the data from 24 transition economies for the years 1999, 2002 and 
2005, we employ a conventional fixed effects approach as well as a recent innovation in 
fixed effect panel analysis, known as fixed effect vector decomposition (FEVD), which 
hitherto has not been used in this context. The main benefit of this approach is that it 
enables us to model the effect of time-invariant (or, at least, “slow moving”) variables, 
most notably proxies for institutional development. These determinants were not 
captured by previous studies (Riahl-Belkaoiu, 2004; Richardson, 2006; Nur-tegin, 2008; 
Joulfaian, 2009; and Alon and Hageman, 2012) 
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we provide a brief overview of 
existing cross-country investigations. In Section 3 we describe the data used in our study 
and we review the major determinants of tax evasion. In Section 4 we outline the 
general form of the regression model. In Section 5 we focus on our approach to 
estimation and highlight the importance of diagnostic testing. Sections 6 and 7 report 
and discuss the empirical findings. The final section concludes. 
2. Theory and determinants of tax evasion 
Over four decades of research on tax evasion have given rise to an enormous 
amount of work (for reviews see Jackson and Milliron, 1986; Cowell, 1990; Andreoni, 
et.al, 1998; and Franzoni 2008 and Torgler 2011). The vast majority of this work, 
however, has neglected three important factors. The first factor relates to the 
importance of cross-country investigations. In one of the most insightful reviews of tax 
evasion, Andreoni et al. (1998, p.855), while concluding and providing directions for 
future research, argue that “…a broadening of the empirical database will improve the power of 
statistical tests of theoretical models, and spur comparative analysis across countries ”. The second 
factor relates to the lack of studies on business tax evasion. As Torgler (2011) argues, 
“...business tax evasion in general, has received very little attention. Work in this area is therefore highly 
relevant (p.6)”. Last, the context of transition economies in tax evasion studies has 
received limited attention (Pirttila, 1999). 
In this paper we attempt to fill these gaps by introducing all three components: 
business tax evasion; cross-country comparison; and the transition context. In order to 
do so, we start by assuming that the behaviour of businesses is similar to the behaviour 
                                                 
6 We thank an anonymous referee for suggesting to control for corruption related to tax administration 
and to distinguish it from general corruption  
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of individuals, and that the determinants of business tax evasion may be similar, at least 
qualitatively, to the determinants of tax evasion by individuals or households. The 
decision on evasion, or compliance, is made by individual managers or entrepreneurs 
who, in essence, act as individuals (Arias, 2005). As Slemrod (2007, p.36) points out, the 
literature on business tax evasion "adapts the theory of tax evasion, which for the most 
part concerns individual decision makers, to the tax compliance decisions made by 
businesses” . This is particularly true of small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) 
where the decision making entrepreneur makes compliance decisions both as an 
individual and as a manager.  
Ever since Allingham and Sandmo’s conventional model was introduced in 1972, 
theoretical and empirical literature on tax evasion has flourished. Advances 
incorporating interactions between institutions and taxpayers, cultural and behavioural 
differences as well as individual socio-demographic characteristics have also been made. 
These and conventional determinants of tax evasion, namely the tax rate, fine rate and 
audit rate, have contributed profoundly to modelling compliance decisions.  
In the traditional model the level of income tax evasion is negatively related to the 
level of punishment7 imposed by law and the probability of audit by tax examiners.8 
When analysing the impact of tax rates on evasion, the model predicts an ambiguous 
effect with the occurrence of both an income effect (as tax rates rise, people become 
poorer and, in the presence of decreasing absolute risk aversion, they evade less) and a 
substitution effect (rising taxes means that the return from evasion is higher, thus the 
taxpayer prefers the risky choice to the safer one). However, Yitzhaki (1974) argued that 
the ambiguity was a result of an unrealistic assumption of the model that the penalty is 
imposed on the amount of income not reported; if instead it is imposed on the evaded 
tax the substitution effect disappears and thus a tax rise will reduce evasion. Most of the 
models on business tax evasion have conducted comparative static analysis similar to 
that of the traditional model; namely, the firm evades less with higher probability of 
detection and larger fines, while the impact of tax rates is ambiguous (see Marelli, 1984; 
Marelli and Martina, 1988; Virmani, 1989; Sandmo, 2004; Crocker and Slemrod, 2005). 
Consistent with the theory, the empirical evidence on the impact of tax rates is 
quite controversial. Clotfelter (1983) was the first author to make use of the US Tax 
Compliance Measurement Programme (TCMP) data to investigate evasion. His 
empirical analysis found positive and significant effects of the marginal tax rate on 
evasion. Similar results were reported by Pommerehne and Weck (1996) for 
Switzerland, Carroll (1998) for the US, Gorodnichenko et al. (2009) for Russia, Chiarini 
et al. (2008) for Italy, Sillamaa and Veall (2000) for Canada, and Fisman et al. (2004) for 
China. Similarly, Friedland et al. (1978), Collins and Plumlee (1991), and Alm et al. 
(1992) used laboratory experiments to show that participants’ compliance decreased 
whenever the tax rate increased. Perhaps the biggest challenge to Clotelfter’s findings 
                                                 
7 For the positive relationship between fine rate and tax compliance see Friedland et al.(1978), Grasmick 
and Scott (1982), Witte and Woodbury (1985) , Becker et al. (1987) and Beck et al. (1991), Alm et al. 
(1992), Alm et al (1995), Hasseldine et al. (2007), Park and Hyun (2003). For negative relationship see 
Schwartz and Orleans (1967), Strumpel (1969) and Fjeldstad and Semboja (2001). For no effect see 
Baldry (1987), Webley et al. (1991), Pommerehne and Weck (1996), and Ali et al. (2001). 
8 For the positive relationship between audit rates and compliance see Witte and Woodbury (1985), Crane 
and Nourzad (1986), Dubin et al. (1987) and Pommerehne and Weck-Hannemann (1996), Spicer and 
Hero (1985), Chang et al. (1987), Beck et al. (1991), Alm et al. (1995), Trivedi et al. (2004) and Feld et 
al. (2007), Kleven et al. (2010) and Slemrod et al. (2001).  
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comes from Feinstein (1991) as, employing the same data source (TCMP) and using a 
pooled model for the years 1982 and 1985, he found that the marginal tax rate has a 
negative relation with evasion. A negative relationship is also reported by Alm et al. 
(1995) for Spain, Kamdar (1997) for USA, and Alm et.al (1990) for Jamaica. To make 
the review on the impact of tax rates even more ambiguous, the works of Baldry (1987), 
Porcano (1988) and Joulfain and Rider (1996) found that tax rates had no effect at all on 
evasion.  
The conventional model consisting of tax rate, audit and fine rate has often been 
criticized for its simplicity. Andreoni et al. (1998, p.850) argue in favour of incorporating 
morals and social dynamics:  
 
...it has been suggested that factors such as a moral obligation to be truthful, or the social 
consequences of being a known cheater, may add further enforcement incentives that are not 
accounted for in our models .  
 
Further they elaborate three main groups of factors that are important when 
treating tax evasion models. The first group involves moral rules and sentiments that 
directly guide and impact the decision to comply or not. The field of individual tax 
morale has attracted attention from researchers quite recently (for an extensive review 
see Torgler, 2007), while the perspective of business tax morale is still unexplored. The 
second group relates to how the fairness of the tax system and its enforcement affects 
individuals’ willingness to comply. Jackson and Milliron (1986, p.137) argued that tax 
fairness consists of at least two different dimensions: “One dimension appears to involve the 
equity of the trade - the benefits received for the tax dollars given...”; “...the other dimension appears to 
involve the equity of the taxpayers’ burden in reference to that of other individuals ”. Last, the third 
group includes taxpayers’ evaluations of the government according to the prevailing 
standards of performance, corruption and transparency. Hanousek and Palda (2004) 
looked at tax evasion as a form of legitimate protest by citizens against the government. 
Tirole (1996) explains that when taxpayers see their government as corrupted and 
unfair, evasion is seen as a “vote of dissent” from government. Accordingly, a strong 
positive relationship between corruption and tax evasion is reported by Tirole (1996), 
Anderson (2006) Picur and Riahi-Blekaoui (2005), Pashev (2005), Fjelsdad (2004), Nur-
tegin (2008) and Joulfaian (2009). 
Socio-cultural determinants appear also as a powerful factor in influencing evasive 
behaviour (Nerre, 2001). According to Chau and Leung (2009), different social norms 
and ethical values create different incentives for tax evasion. Cultural attributes in tax 
evasion are also highlighted by Cummings et al. (2005) and Chan et al. (2000) where 
peer influence is seen as part of the cultural characteristics of specific groups of 
individuals or nations. Chau and Leung (2009) and Grasmick and Scott (1982) indicate 
that respondents with peers involved in unlawful activities are more likely to be non-
compliant.  
Amongst many factors, the tax evasion literature relates taxpayers’ ability to 
comprehend and comply with tax laws to education. Two opposing effects are 
observed. On the one hand, fiscal knowledge may positively influence the practice of 
evasion, as more educated people involved in businesses may tend to better understand 
the opportunities for evading tax obligations. On the other hand, more educated people 
understand the importance of taxes better, which increases their level of voluntary 
compliance. The level of education is particularly important at the firm level. As Vogel 
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(1974) indicated, less educated taxpayers need more assistance, which in turn increases 
costs of compliance and thus evasive behaviour. In the empirical literature, a negative 
relationship between education and tax evasion is found by Dubin and Wilde (1988), 
Eriksen and Fallan (1996), Chan et al. (2000), Houston and Tran (2001) and Richardson 
(2006); while a positive relationship was reported by Witte and Woodbury (1985), Beron 
et al. (1992) and Scholz and Pinney (1993). 9 
In addition to the conventional moral, socio-cultural and demographic 
determinants, cross-country and within country time-series estimations, for both 
individual and business tax evasion, have also included economic determinants.10 Per 
capita income, unemployment, inflation and other performance indicators are common 
in such studies. Chelliah (1971) argues that higher per capita income reflects a higher 
level of development which, in turn, means not only a greater willingness to pay taxes 
but also a greater capacity to collect taxes. Other studies suggested that those taxpayers 
who have better living standards tend to create stronger bonds with compliant attitudes 
towards social systems (Tanzi, 1980 and Ghura, 1998). Frey and Weck-Hanneman 
(1984), moreover, argue that in countries with low per capita income people tend to 
hold more than just one job, yet tax reporting is more likely to be related only to the 
first job. Sookram and Watson (2005) using data from Trinidad and Tobago for the 
period 1960-2000 found that the per capita income had a negative relationship with tax 
evasion in the short run. However, in the long run this variable was not statistically 
significant and even had a positive relationship with tax evasion. 
It is widely believed that an increase in unemployment is usually associated with 
reduced income that, consequently, increases levels of tax evasion. Furthermore, an 
increase in cash payments caused by an increase in unemployment (as individuals may 
switch to the “hidden” economy) may give rise to problems related to tax collection. 
Boame (2009), using Canadian aggregate macroeconomic time-series data from 1987 to 
2003, found that an increase in the unemployment rate has a positive and statistically 
significant effect on tax evasion. 
Views of the impact of inflation on tax evasion are summarised in two opposing 
groups. Fishburn (1981), amongst many, argues that inflation has a positive relationship 
with tax evasion as the decision to evade can be affected by the attempt of taxpayers to 
restore their purchasing power. Tanzi (1980) on the other hand argues that taxpayers 
delay tax payments to future high inflation periods, creating an overall negative 
relationship between inflation and tax evasion. 
Following the above discussion, we estimate a model that combines the traditional 
determinants with institutional, behavioural and economic determinants. The following 
section provides a detailed description of the variables. 
                                                 
9 Gender studies show that female taxpayers are more compliant than men (for survey studies see, e.g., 
Vogel, 1974; Mason and Calvin, 1978; Minor, 1978; Aitken and Bonneville, 1980; Tittle, 1980; and 
Torgler and Schneider, 2006; for experiments, Spicer and Becker, 1980; Spicer and Hero, 1985; and 
Baldry, 1987).  
10 Firm level studies covered also firm characteristic determinants, such as size, legal status, ownership, 
sector, performance and region amongst others.  
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3. Research Design 
3.1. Data 
In this model, the dependent variable, Tax Evasion, is the most difficult to 
quantify. Furthermore, as evasion is not directly observable, the information on which 
the measure of tax evasion is based is difficult to obtain, particularly for transition 
economies and especially when dealing with businesses. In order to assess the level of 
tax evasion, we use the Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey 
(BEEPS) database, produced jointly by the European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development (EBRD) and the World Bank, which provides firm-level data on a broad 
range of variables related to the business environment and performance of firms. 11 The 
question of interest for the present study is as follows: 
 
Q.48a (1999), Q.58 (2002) and Q.43a (2005) - What percentage of the sales of a typical 
firm in your area of activity would you estimate is reported to the tax authorities, bearing in 
mind difficulties with complying with taxes and other regulations? 
 
Although the main question does not directly measure the level of compliance by 
the respondent, it is designed to act as a reasonable substitute by taking into account the 
respondents’ obvious reluctance to reveal their own compliance. Such indirect measures 
of compliance (and other unlawful activities) are common in survey research.12 We 
transform the question from a measure of compliance into a measure of evasion by 
subtracting the percentage of sales reported for tax purposes from 100.13  
Table 1 displays the tax evasion levels for 24 transition countries for all available 
years; these data define the extent of our panel dataset.14 To our knowledge, this is the 
largest sample of transition countries so far used to assess the determinants of business 
tax evasion.  
  
                                                 
11 The first round of the BEEPS, in 1999, surveyed 4,100 enterprises from 25 transition countries and 
Turkey. The sample size increased to 6,667 firms from 27 transition countries including Turkey but 
excluding Turkmenistan in the second round of the survey in 2002. The 2005 round covered around 
9,500 firms in 28 transition countries, including Turkey and Turkmenistan. We did not include the latest 
round of BEEPS data (2008/09) as the main question on the level of tax evasion was dropped from the 
questionnaire in this survey. 
12 For more on how to conduct evasion questionnaires see Breman (1980), Hanousek and Palda (2004) 
and Gerxhani (2006). 
13 For 1999, the respondents were asked to provide answers in eight categories between 0-100%. For each 
response we have taken the mid-point of the range; then we derived a country level of tax evasion by 
averaging mid-points. In the 2002 and 2005 surveys respondents were asked to provide a figure (in 
percentages) for the proportion of sales reported to the authorities. We then averaged these responses 
by country and thus obtained a country level of business tax compliance. After averaging we subtracted 
each result from 100% in order to get the measure of tax evasion for each country. 
14 We had to exclude Serbia, Kosovo, Tajikistan and Montenegro because of the unavailability of data for 
these three countries over the three survey periods. For 1999 we averaged the responses of Bosnia and 
Republica Srpska to obtain the level of business tax compliance for Bosnia and Herzegovina as a whole. 
Last, as suggested by BEEPS (1999), we dropped country-level estimates for Lithuania and Slovakia for 
the year 1999, due to methodological mistakes committed by the survey team; instead we had to 
extrapolate data from the previous two years in order to get estimates for these two countries in the 
year 1999. 
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Table 1 Levels of business tax evasion in transition economies 
    1999 2002 2005 
1 ALBANIA 69.56 22.53 22.96 
2 ARMENIA 19.22 9.19 4.51 
3 AZERBAIJAN 32.07 13.09 13.94 
4 BELARUS 5.75 8.12 7.17 
5 BOSNIA  53.54 32.46 11.79 
6 BULGARIA 27.65 17.19 13.54 
7 CROATIA 23.77 12.69 7.58 
8 CZECH REPUBLIC 22.64 9.84 13.09 
9 ESTONIA 15.95 7.32 3.07 
10 GEORGIA 33.16 35.66 10.85 
11 HUNGARY 15.06 11.55 11.28 
12 KAZAKHSTAN 15.16 17.28 6.61 
13 KYRGYZISTAN 16.98 26.15 14.65 
14 LATVIA 24.14 12.57 7.10 
15 LITHUANIA 19.04 14.66 10.28 
16 MACEDONIA FYR 24.02 36.23 23.48 
17 MOLDOVA 18.97 20.47 10.54 
18 POLAND 14.59 9.78 10.00 
19 ROMANIA 12.04 13.36 6.55 
20 RUSSIA 23.02 18.04 15.55 
21 SLOVAK REPUBLIC 21.77 13.11 4.45 
22 SLOVENIA 3.47 17.96 7.23 
23 UKRAINE 25.43 14.56 10.68 
24 UZBEKISTAN 20.26 10.54 2.97 
*Source: Author's aggregated data from BEEPS 99,02,05 
 
The independent variables are grouped in the following categories: tax rate, 
economic performance, institutional and cultural factors.  
Tax rate is the only traditional determinant of tax evasion considered in this paper. 
Given the data constrains, we are unable to identify suitable proxies for the two 
remaining traditional variables: the probability of audit; and the fine rate. We use the 
Fiscal Freedom Index to account for the tax burden across countries. The Economic 
performance group includes the level and trends of economic development throughout 
transition economies. It encompasses all those economic factors that affect a firm’s 
operations but that are outside the firm’s ability to control and influence. We use four 
proxies to capture the national economic environment: real per capita GDP; unemployment; 
inflation; and non-performing loans. Institutions reflect the institutional development of a country. 
The institutional framework may be defined in a number of ways. In this paper, we explore the 
impact of corruption. We differentiate between corruption related to tax administration and 
corruption as a perception. For the former we generate data from the BEEPS dataset; for the 
latter we use Freedom from Corruption from the Heritage Foundation. For the institutional reforms 
in transition economies we use Transition Index published by the European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (EBRD). Last, culture proxies socio-cultural differences 
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between countries and captures social norms and educational levels within each 
country.15  
Table 2 presents the list of variables together with their description, expected 
effects with respect to tax evasion (derived from the literature review above, which refers 
to the inverse of tax evasion, i.e. tax compliance) and the data source.  
We acknowledge two main issues of endogeneity when using some of the proxies 
of corruption and tax evasion. One concern relates to potential sources of endogeneity: 
omitted variables; and simultaneity. On the first potential source, perceptions of levels 
of corruption and levels of tax evasion as well as measures of social norms may all be 
output variables with shared underlying determinants, some of which are necessarily 
omitted from the model (either because theoretical support and/or empirical evidence is 
lacking or because there are no suitable measures). Nonetheless, fixed effects estimation 
minimizes this type of potential endogeneity by controlling for all “time invariant” 
and/or “slowly moving” unobserved determinants of tax evasion, corruption and social 
norms. Country-level fixed effects imply that such determinants are moved from the 
error term into the estimated part of the model, thereby removing this source of 
potential endogeneity that otherwise might arise from omitted variables.  
The second potential source of endogeneity is that corruption may be induced by 
tax evasion opportunities.16 However, induced effects work sequentially not 
simultaneously; for example, it takes time for corrupt officials to recognise greater levels 
of tax evasion and then to try to extract more rent by colluding with tax evaders. 
Accordingly, we assume that current levels of corruption condition current levels of tax 
evasion but that current levels of tax evasion contribute – as one influence among many 
– to future levels of corruption only. Hence, in our model, the feedback from tax 
evasion into perceptions of the level of corruption is not a source of simultaneity bias. 
                                                 
15 Other social factors such as age or region could not be included in this research given the lack of 
relevant data at firm level. Aggregation of other individual data for business research requires strong 
assumptions. Amongst others, the ratio between male and female population, or in the labour force, 
does not necessarily represent the gender structure of businesses in transition economies given 
disproportions in ownership by gender.  
16 We thank an anonymous referee for bringing this point to our attention.  
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Table 2 Summary of independent variables 
Variable Description 
Expected 
Sign  
Source 
TaxRate 
The level of tax rates across countries, proxied by the Fiscal Freedom Index, an 
element of the Index of Economic Freedom for the years 1999, 2002 and 2005. 
The Index combines the top tax rates on individual and corporate incomes and 
the overall amount of tax revenue as a percentage of GDP. The index is 
presented in percentages. 
Ambiguous 
The Heritage 
Foundation 1999, 
2002, 2005 
Real GDP per 
capita 
GDP per capita expressed in constant US dollars ($). Negative 
World Bank 1999, 
2002, 2005 
Unemployment Unemployment rate expressed in percentages Positive 
International 
Monetary Fund 1999, 
2002, 2005 
Inflation Average annual percentage change in the Consumer Price Index  Ambiguous 
Transition Report 
1999, 2002, 2005 
Business 
Environment 
Business environment across countries proxied by the ratio of non-performing 
loans to total loans of commercial banks. Non-performing loans include 
categories of loans classified as sub-standard, doubtful and loss making, but 
exclude loans transferred to a state rehabilitation agency or consolidation bank, 
end-of-year. 
 
Positive 
Transition Report 
1999, 2002, 2006 
TranIndex 
Intensity of reforms, proxied by the Transition Index; an average of six 
standard EBRD transition indicators measuring progress in transition. Progress 
is measured against the standards of industrialised market economies, while 
recognising that there is neither a “pure” market economy nor a unique end-
point for transition. The Index ranges from 1 to 4+, where 1 represents little or 
no change from a rigid centrally planned economy and 4+ represents the 
standards of an industrialised market economy.  
 
Negative 
World Governance 
Indicators 1999, 
2002, 2005 
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Variable Description 
Expected 
Sign  
Source 
Freedom from 
Corruption 
The score for this component is derived primarily from Transparency 
International’s Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI). The CPI is based on a 10-
point scale in which a score of 10 indicates very little corruption and a score of 
0 indicates a very corrupt government. In scoring freedom from corruption, 
the Index converts the raw CPI data to a scale of 0 to 100 by multiplying the 
CPI score by 10.  
Negative 
The Heritage 
Foundation 1999, 
2002, 2005 
Corruption related 
to Tax 
Administration 
Q.25, Q.54 and Q39 – “Thinking about officials, would you say the following 
statements are always, usually, frequently, sometimes, seldom or never true? – 
It is common for firms in my line of business to have to pay some irregular 
“additional payments/gifts” to get things done with regards to customs, taxes, 
licences, regulations, services, etc.” 
 
Positive 
BEEPS 
1999,2002,2005 
Social Norms 
Social norms, or general attitude of society towards systems; proxied by electric 
power transmission and distribution losses. These include losses in 
transmission between sources of supply and points of distribution and losses in 
the distribution to consumers, including pilferage. Persistent refusal in a 
specific system over a certain period becomes a common social habit for other 
systems as well. 
 
Positive 
World Development 
Indicators 1999, 
2002, 2005 
Education 
The level of education within a country, proxied by the number of new 
entrants to the first grade of secondary education (general programs only) in a 
given year, expressed as a percentage of the number of pupils enrolled in the 
final grade of primary education in the previous year. 
 
Negative 
World Bank 1999, 
2002, 2005 
Year 2002 Dummy Variable for data from 2002 (1999 is the omitted category) Negative BEEPS 2002 
Year 2005 Dummy Variable for data from 2005 (1999 is the omitted category)  Negative BEEPS 2005 
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3.2. Regression Model 
To investigate the determinants of tax evasion in transition economies, we 
estimate the following model: 
 
TaxEvasionit= θ̂i + θ̂1TaxRateit + θ̂2GDPpercapitait + θ̂3Unemploymentit +  θ̂4Inflationit + 
                        +θ̂5BusinessEnvit + θ̂6TranIndexit+ θ̂7CorruptionGenit +θ̂8CorruptionAdminit+  
                        + θ̂9SocialNormsit + θ̂10Education it + it 
 
The subscript i refers to countries (1,..., 24) and t to years 1999, 2002 and 2005. 
TaxEvasionit stands for the level of evasion; TaxRateit is the tax rate levied on businesses; 
GDPpercapitait is the level of real per capita income; Unemploymentit is the unemployment 
rate; Inflationit is the inflation rate; BusinessEnvit is the state of the business environment 
proxied by the share of non-performing loans as a percentage of total loans; TranIndexit 
is the EBRD’s transition index showing the progress of transition; CorruptionGenit is the 
Freedom from Corruption score; CorruptionAdminit is corruption related to tax 
administration, SocialNormsit is the society’s attitude towards systems and compliance 
requirements (or social norms) proxied by the level of electricity losses and theft as a 
percentage of total output; while Educationit is the progression rate of students to 
secondary school as a percentage of total graduates from primary schools. θ̂i are country 
fixed effects that control for all time invariant – or, at least, slowly moving – national 
geographic, historical/cultural, institutional, social and economic influences not 
otherwise explicitly specified in the model. θ̂1-10 are estimated coefficients that measure 
the effects of each dependent variable on tax evasion. Finally, it is the usual white noise 
error term.  
Table 3 reports descriptive statistics for the variables used in the model for our 
panel of 24 transition economies. The next section elaborates on various econometric 
issues related to the estimation of the model. 
 
Table 3 Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
TaxEvasion 72 16.68 11.09 2.97 69.56 
TaxRate 72 72.08 11.77 44.9 91.5 
GDPpercapita 72 3676 3594 259.8 17908 
Unemployment 72 12.77 8.32 0.3 37.25 
Inflation 72 13.01 36.2 -8.5 293.7 
BusinessEnv 72 12.66 13.29 0.1 62.6 
TranIndex 72 3.22 0.59 1.55 3.99 
CorruptionGen 72 32.2 13.88 10 70 
CorruptionAdmin 72 2.42 0.61 1.17 3.95 
SocialNorms 72 16.12 9.23 3.43 48.8 
Education 72 98.13 1.59 92.2 99.93 
Year 2002 72 0.33 0.47 0 1 
Year 2005 72 0.33 0.47 0 1 
(1) 
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There are no missing observations; hence, econometric estimation proceeds using 
a fully balanced panel. The next section elaborates various econometric issues with 
corresponding implications for the specification and estimation of the model.  
3.3. Econometric Issues 
Post estimation, we subjected our conventional fixed effects model to a series of 
diagnostic tests. The Pesaran (2004) test for cross sectional dependence fails to indicate 
the presence of cross-section dependence at the 10% level; however, we include two 
period dummy variables for the years 2002 and 2005 to account for the potential effects 
of common shocks. The modified Wald Test for groupwise heteroskedasticity indicated 
substantial heteroskedasticity, which is common in panel datasets. Accordingly, we 
report robust standard errors, which are also robust to clustering effects in the data. For 
small datasets, cluster robust standard errors can be smaller than the default standard 
errors; therefore, we report both.  
Although we have too few observations in the time-series dimension to test for 
serial correlation in the residuals, these standard errors are robust to arbitrary departures 
from independence within each cluster (country). Finally, we investigated the 
distribution of the errors. Normality is not required in order to obtain unbiased 
estimates of the regression coefficients. However, it is required for valid hypothesis 
testing in small samples. Our test results revealed non-normality. Thus prompted to 
investigate, we found two outliers: Albania for the year 1999 (AL99); and Macedonia 
for the year 1999 (MC99). The inclusion of two corresponding dummy variables 
improves significantly the distribution of the residuals (the null hypothesis of no 
skewness, no excess kurtosis and, jointly, of normality cannot be rejected at 
conventional levels of significance). Full details of these diagnostic tests, together with 
the Stata user-written programmes used to implement them, are available on request. 
Before we interpret our final results, we introduce a recently developed alternative 
to conventional fixed effects (FE) estimation. Because it is new to the tax evasion 
literature, we present the key concepts of the Fixed Effects Vector Decomposition 
(FEVD) approach (Plümper and Troeger, 2004) and explain its application to our case. 
3.3.1. Fixed Effect Vector Decomposition 
In fixed effects estimation, the group-specific fixed effects (i.e., dummy variables) 
fully account for all between-group variation. From this characteristic arise both the 
main advantage and the main disadvantages of FE estimation.  
The great advantage is that the group-specific fixed effects control for all 
unobserved sources of time-invariant heterogeneity between groups. The corresponding 
disadvantages are two-fold: first, the group-specific fixed effects fully account also for 
all observed sources of time invariant heterogeneity between groups so that time-invariant 
variables cannot be separately estimated (they are perfectly collinear with the fixed 
effects); a second but less well known corollary of the full absorption of between-group 
variation by the group-specific fixed effects, and the corresponding loss of information, 
is that observed variables with relatively little within-group variation cannot be estimated 
efficiently (Plümper and Troeger, 2007).  
Plümper and Troeger (2007, p.127) elaborate on the implications of this second 
disadvantage:  
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... inefficiency does not just imply low levels of significance; point estimates are also 
unreliable since the influence of the error on the estimated coefficients becomes larger as the 
inefficiency of the estimator increases.  
 
To address both of these disadvantages, Plümper and Troeger (2007) propose 
their Fixed Effects Vector Decomposition (FEDV) estimator. This is a three-stage 
approach that combines fixed effects estimation to analyse the effect of variables with 
relatively high within-group variation and pooled ordinary least squares (OLS) 
estimation of both time-invariant and “rarely changing” (or slowly moving) variables 
with relatively low within-group variation (Plümper and Troeger, 2011). With reference 
to our model, FEDV proceeds as follows. 
Stage One is fixed effects estimation of our preferred model specified in 
Equation 1 with two additional country dummies (for Albania 1999 and Macedonia 
1999) introduced given the empirical considerations. This model includes several 
variables that are rarely changing but none that are completely time invariant (see Table 
4 below).  
Stage Two is a cross-section regression of the vector of the estimated group 
fixed effects (θ̂i) from Equation 1 on the time invariant variables and/or rarely changing 
explanatory variables from Equation 1 (our fully-specified model includes only the 
latter). The Stage 2 treatment of slowly moving variables in FEVD estimation is 
necessary to address the problem that conventional fixed effects estimates of the effects 
of slowly moving variables can be imprecise, as noted above.  
A second reason arises in cases where researchers are concerned by unobserved 
correlations between the estimated group fixed effects (θ̂i) and time varying but slowly 
moving variables, Plümper and Troeger (2007, p.136) find that “we can reduce the potential 
for bias of the estimation by including additional time-invariant or rarely changing variables into stage 
2”, while warning that “this may reduce bias but is likely to also reduce efficiency”. In country-
level panels covering only a short time span such correlations and corresponding 
estimation biases can be presumed to be prevalent. In such cases, fixed effects capture 
unobserved time invariant country influences, which – given the short sample period - 
includes broad influences associated with history, culture and institutions that are most 
likely to be correlated with one or more of the slowly moving variables.  
Accordingly, to address these potential problems in estimating our model, we 
follow the rule of thumb recommended by Plümper and Troeger (2007) for the 
inclusion of variables in the Stage 2 regression. This guideline was subsequently 
endorsed by Greene (2011, p.9):  
 
Strictly time invariant characteristics will obviously be included and variables with 
sufficiently low within-variance should also be included ... a between-to-within ratio of 2.8 is 
sufficient to justify the inclusion of the variable in the second stage.  
 
Table 4 below compares the between- and within-group variation (measured by 
standard deviations) for each variable in our model and indicates those that, according 
to this guideline, are slowly moving and thus included in our Stage 2 regression. 
 
  
 L. Abdixhiku, G. Pugh , I. Hashi, Business Tax Evasion in Transition Economies: A Cross-Country Panel Investigation 
 
 
 
Available online at http://eaces.liuc.it 
25 
Table 4 Identifying Slowly Changing Variables 
Variable 
Between 
Group 
Variations 
Within 
Group 
Variations 
Between/Within 
Ratio 
Slowly 
Changing* 
TaxEvasion 7.86 7.93 0.99 
 
GDPpercapita 3266 1599 2.04 
 
Unemployment 7.94 2.81 2.82 * 
Inflation 23.73 27.7 0.85 
 
BusinessEnv 9.20 9.72 0.94 
 
TaxRate 9.58 7.03 1.36 
 
TranIndex 0.59 0.12 4.91 * 
CorruptionGen 12.44 6.51 1.91 
 
CorruptionAdmin 0.43 0.44 0.97 
 
SocialNorm 8.98 2.60 3.45 * 
Education 1.29 0.95 1.35 
 
Year 2002 5.67E-17 0.47 0 
 
Year 2005 5.67E-17 0.47 0 
 
AL99 5.67E-17 0.47 0 
 
MC99 5.67E-17 0.47 0 
 
* If value > Rule of Thumb 2.8; Source: Authors, using STATA 11 
 
Accordingly, our Stage 2 FEVD regression is specified as follows: 
θ̂i= ?̂?0+ β̂1Unemploymentit+ β̂2TranIndexit+ β̂3SocialNormsit+ ωi 
where ?̂?0 is the intercept; and ωi is the unobservable part of the fixed effects (i.e. “the 
second stage residual”). This Stage 2 regression decomposes the vector of estimated 
group fixed effects from Equation 1 (θ̂i) into two parts: the effects of the intercept β0 
and the observed slowly moving variables (Unemployment, TranIndex and SocialNorms); and 
the unobserved group effects (the Stage 2 residual, ωi). It is this decomposition that 
characterises the FEVD estimator and that integrates its FE and pooled-OLS 
components.  
Stage Three: Finally, the unobservable part (ωi) of the estimated vector of fixed 
effects (θ̂i) obtained in Stage 2 is substituted for the vector of unit fixed effects (θ̂i) in 
Equation 1.17 Since the estimated unobservable effects 𝜔?̂? control for potential sources 
of omitted variable bias, and are - by design - not correlated with the time invariant 
variables (Plümper and Troeger, 2007), we estimate the resulting Equation 3 by pooled 
OLS. In this case, the final model yields unbiased estimates, although the standard 
errors must be adjusted to account for 𝜔?̂? being estimated in Stage 2, hence subject to 
error, as well as for unrepresented degrees of freedom (Plümper and Troger, 2007) (in a 
small sample, not making this adjustment will severely underestimate the standard 
                                                 
17 If observable time invariant variables are part of the fully-specified model then these also appear in the 
Stage 2 regression and are then substituted, along with the unobservable part (ωi) of the estimated 
vector of fixed effects (θ̂i), for the vector of unit fixed effects (θ̂i) in Equation 1.  
(2) 
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errors).18,19 The estimated coefficient on 𝜔?̂? should be either equal to - or at least close to 
- 1.0 (Greene, 2010 and 2011), which may be regarded as a specification check on 
FEVD estimation. 
 
TaxEvasionit= θ̂0+ θ̂1TaxRateit+ θ̂2GDPcapitait+ θ̂3Unemploymentit+ θ̂4Inflationit+ 
                      + θ̂5BusinessEnvit+θ̂6TranIndexit+ θ̂7CorruptionGenit +θ̂8CorruptionAdminit + 
                      + θ̂9SocialNormsit+ θ̂10Education it+ θ̂11Year2002 it+ θ̂12Year2005 it +             
                      + θ̂13AL99 it + θ̂14MC99 it + ?̂?i + it       
 
 
Compared to conventional fixed effects estimation, the FEVD approach has an 
advantage with respect to the estimation of slowly moving variables: because the Stage 3 
regression is estimated by OLS, both between-group and within-group variation is taken 
into account, which gives superior efficiency (i.e., more precise estimates). OLS 
estimation also has the advantage of a widely understood range of diagnostic tests and 
checks on the statistical integrity of the model. In the case of the model specified in 
Equation 3, standard diagnostic tests suggest that this Stage 3 FEVD regression is 
statistically well specified with respect to homoskedasticity, normal distribution of the 
model errors and as a linear model. In addition, diagnostic checks suggest no undue 
influence from (multi) collinearity or high-leverage observations. A final advantage of 
FEVD, shared with conventional fixed effects estimation, is that it is well suited for the 
estimation of small samples, particularly because OLS has known small sample 
properties. In comparison with estimators whose properties are known only 
asymptotically, FEVD may be particularly appropriate for analysing transition and 
institutional processes where panel datasets are often small (Plümper and Troger, 2007; 
Beck, 2011). For example, the cross-section dimension of the dataset in the present 
study is limited to the number of transition economies. FEVD estimation may have one 
disadvantage in short panels (for example, the three-periods available to the present 
study). Monte Carlo simulations establish that the accuracy of the standard errors on the 
time invariant variables depends on the number of the time series observations (T) in 
the panel (Plümper and Troger, 2011). Although the simulation evidence suggests that 
the FEVD standard errors on the time invariant variables are most accurate when the 
number of both cross-section and time series observations (N and T) both exceed 20, 
no evidence is reported on the extent of deterioration for T<10. For this reason, we do 
not report only FEVD estimates but also those from conventional fixed effects 
estimation. 
As argued, the greatest advantage of Fixed Effect Vector Decomposition (FEVD) 
approach lies in its ability to account for slowly moving variables. In our model, 
“unemployment”, “transition index” and “social norms” are all slowly moving variables. 
                                                 
18 Since we include only one variable (the error term of the second stage) to account for all remaining 
unobservable country effects in the third stage regression, we adjust the degrees of freedom by (θ̂i-1), 
which in our case is 23. 
19 An important practical consequence for researchers is that the appropriate Stata ado-file to implement 
FEVD is version xtfevd4.0beta.ado (the latest at the time of writing), which computes standard errors 
based on an appropriately revised variance equation. This file, which is available from Plümper and 
Troeger’s website, executes all three steps of FEVD and adjusts the variance-covariance matrix for the 
degrees of freedom. 
(3) 
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Employing standard Fixed Effect approach in this case would not provide accurate 
estimations. Because of FEVD we have been able to understand the impact of – 
especially – the“transition index” and “social norms” in tax evasion; as these two 
variables appear to be statistically significant and with signs in line with theoretical 
expectations. 
4. Empirical Results and Analysis 
The results are presented in three columns in Table 5. Column 1 presents fixed 
effects estimates of the basic model (Equation 1); Column 2 presents fixed effects 
results using cluster-robust standard errors (to address various sources of departure 
from the assumption of white noise error terms). Finally, the third column presents the 
FEVD estimates. The interpretation of results is based on this column.  
Most of the estimated effects are in accordance with the theory and the previous 
empirical literature. The estimates consistently suggest that TaxRate, BusinessEnv, 
SocialNorms and institutions (proxied by TranIndex and CorruptionAdmin) are the most 
economically influential and consistently statistically significant variables. The 
association between TaxRate and TaxEvasion is positive and significant at the 1% level. 
An one percentage change in the level of the Fiscal Freedom Index, that is an increase 
in tax burden, leads to a rise of the tax evasion level by more than one third of a 
percentage point.  
The relationship between TranIndex and TaxEvasion is negative and significant at 
the 10% level. An increase of the Transition Index by one point, that is improvement in 
reforms, lessens the level of tax evasion by 8.36%. On corruption, we find that there is 
distinction between general perception on corruption and corruption related to tax 
administration. While we fail to establish any statistical significance on CorruptionGen, we 
find that CorruptionAdmin is positively related to tax evasion at the five percent level of 
significance.  
The relationship between real GDPpercapita and TaxEvasion is positive across all 
estimations but the coefficient is very small: a huge amount of extra income per capita is 
required to make any substantial difference in the level of tax evasion: around $1,000 of 
additional per capita income are needed to increase tax evasion by a single percentage 
point (this is purely indicative as, strictly speaking, this is outside the range of a merely 
marginal change). The other economic performance variable, BusinessEnv, appears to be 
statistically significant at one percent level. There is a positive relationship between firm 
non-performance and tax evasion; an increase of non-performing loans by one point 
tends to increase tax evasion by one fifth of the point. The other two remaining 
economic variables Unemployment and Inflation do not appear as statistically significant.  
The next sub-group of highly significant regressors are the dummy variables. The 
period dummies suggest that, at the 1% level of significance, compared to the base year, 
tax evasion falls in 2002 and 2005 by respectively 5 and 13 percent. These numbers are 
consistent with the unconditional statistics on business tax evasion presented in Table 1 
(in which 13 of the 24 countries display continuous improvement) and suggest an 
increase in compliance over time that is consistent with more or less general progress in 
institutional reform. In addition, the dummies for Albania for the year 1999 and 
Macedonia for the year 1999 both suggest strongly positive but temporary effects on tax 
evasion. 
Results for cultural differences and characteristics appear to be in line with 
theoretical expectations. The percentage of electricity losses or theft used as a proxy for 
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SocialNorms is positively related to tax evasion, and statistically significant in FEVD 
estimation. Indeed, it is because of FEVD technique that accounts for slowly moving 
variables, that this particular variable was captured to be significant. Education is 
estimated with a negative sign but is also statistically insignificant across all estimations. 
Finally, as suggested by Plümper and Troeger (2004), our coefficient on ωi is 1.0 in 
FEVD, which confirms that our FEVD model is properly estimated. 
 
Table 5. Regression Results 
 
FIXED EFFECTS FIXED EFFECTS FEVD 
 
1 2 3 
Dependent: Tax 
Evasion 
Coeff  S.E Coeff 
robust 
S.E 
Coeff 
fevd 
S.E 
Tax Rate 0.39 *** 0.11 0.39 ** 0.14 0.39 *** 0.11 
                    
Economic 
Performance 
                  
GDP per capita 1.9E-3 *** 5.8E-4 1.9E-3 *** 5.3E-4 1.9E-3 *** 5.8E-4 
Unemployment 0.06   0.21 0.06   0.16 0.22 
 
0.16 
Inflation -0.01   0.02 -0.01   0.02 -0.16   0.02 
Business 
Environment 
0.24 *** 0.08 0.24  ** 0.10 0.24 *** 0.08 
                    
Institutions                   
Transition Index -9.49   11.07 -9.49   9.58 -8.36 *** 3.03 
Corruption 
General 
0.03 
 
0.10 0.03 
 
0.09 0.03 
 
0.10 
Corruption Tax 
Admin 
4.72 ** 2.08 4.72 ** 1.82 4.72 ** 2.03 
                    
Culture                   
Social Norms 0.35   0.26 0.35   0.26 0.29  * 0.17 
Education 0.24   0.67 0.24   0.53 -0.24   0.60 
                    
Year Dummies                   
2002 -4.92 ** 2.18 -4.92 *** 1.71 -4.92 *** 1.64 
2005 -12.89 *** 3.79 -12.89 *** 3.72 -12.8 *** 2.73 
                    
Constant -21.2 
 
87.2 -21.2   72.7 -33.0   61.4 
Eta             1.00   . 
                    
R-squared 0.57     0.58     0.93     
Number of 
observations 
72     72     72     
Note: *** at 1% level of significance; ** at 5% level of significance; * at 10% level of significance 
 
4.1. Discussion 
One of the most important findings in this study relates to the effect of the tax 
rate on tax evasion, particularly given the theoretical and empirical ambiguity associated 
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with this relationship. A robust positive relationship in our estimated models suggests 
that higher tax rates increase the benefits of evasion as described in the Allingham and 
Sandmo (1972) model. For transition economies, it seems that the substitution effect 
prevails over the income effect.  
We advance evidence that the macroeconomic environment has significant but 
minor effects on business tax evasion. The literature argues that per capita GDP acts as 
a proxy for the general level of development within a country. If so, then in transition 
economies levels of business tax evasion may rise a little as overall prosperity increases. 
However, this effect is very small. A much considerable effect is foreseen within 
business environment. Increased non-performing loans, used as a proxy for difficult 
business environment, show that in times of difficult business environment, businesses 
are more inclined to evade and thus recuperate the lost gain. In other words, the risky 
option of evasion yields higher profits. 
The most important finding of our study is the impact of institutional factors on 
tax evasion. Even if a country is performing well in general economic terms, the 
presence of negative institutional phenomena (most notably corruption and lack of 
reforms) exerts a dominant and immediate influence on the relationship between 
businesses and government. We used the measure of transition reforms and corruption 
to proxy the relationship between businesses and formal institutions. Reforms depend 
on the quality of state bodies which, in turn, affects citizens’ trust in these same bodies, 
while corruption gives rise to both dissatisfaction and opportunities. There is, however, 
a significant distinction between corruption related to tax administration and general 
perception of corruption; with the former causing opportunities for tax evasion. The 
negative effect of both the transition index and the corruption index (government 
effectiveness) on tax evasion is as expected; moreover, the size of these institutional 
effects is economically substantial. The size of the coefficients enforces the general 
claim in the literature that institutional factors do matter in accounting for tax evasion 
and suggests that their inclusion in models of tax evasion for transition economies is 
imperative. Our findings are consistent with several complementary explanations: first, 
if businesses feel betrayed by their government they may respond by non-payment of 
taxes as a form of revolt; secondly, corruption undermines the government-business 
relationship more broadly, thereby loosening feelings of social obligation; thirdly, 
corruption related to tax administration changes the risk of penalties, which suggests 
that businesses from transition economies see corruption also as an opportunity to 
lessen their tax obligations. 
The positive relationship between social norms and tax evasion shows that 
evasive behaviour is not just a response of non-confidence towards the government, but 
it can be also part of a culture; of how people behave towards systems. If 
noncompliance with bills, obligations and other citizenship duties is part of certain 
culture within a country, i.e. is a social norm, then tax evasion is considered morally 
right and totally acceptable. 
Finally, positive, large and highly significant period effects for the Year 2002 and 
the Year 2005 relative to 1999 suggests that tax evasion is falling over time. This again is 
consistent with the importance of transitional reforms, in particular improvements in 
law enforcement and other institutions in these countries.  
The main concern in our work relates to the potential sources of endogeneity; i.e. 
corruption may be induced by tax evasion opportunities. Though we argue in our paper 
that the fixed effects estimation minimizes this type of potential endogeneity by 
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controlling for all “time invariant” and/or “slowly moving” unobserved determinants of 
tax evasion – we acknowledge also that this is a very strong assumption that all essential 
omitted variables are not necessarily “time invariant” and/or “slowly moving”. A good 
example is the substantial anti-corruption reforms in Georgia over our sample period 
(for details see World Bank, 2012).20 Having said that, we acknowledge that the work 
may not have have a strong identification strategy that relies on truly exogenous 
variation in our explanatory variables. Hence our results might reflect correlations which 
do not necessarily imply causation. Still, our work serves as a guidance for future 
research; and we encourage future research to find ways to properly identify it. 
5. Conclusions 
In spite of the extensive literature on tax evasion, business tax evasion in TEs has 
been largely neglected. Yet many of these economies suffer greatly from tax evasion. 
This study contributes to knowledge in this area by providing evidence from a cross-
country investigation of business tax evasion in 24 transition economies. This is 
particularly important as most tax evasion is accounted for by the business sector. As 
well as conventional fixed effects estimation, we employ a recently developed approach 
known as fixed effect vector decomposition (FEVD), which is particularly suited to 
small samples. At each stage particular attention has been paid to model diagnostics to 
ensure the statistical integrity of the models and, hence, the validity of our estimates.  
The major findings of this study are the importance of institutional factors and of 
the tax rate: higher corruption, slower reforms and higher tax rates all reduce 
substantially the amount of taxes paid by businesses in TEs. In addition, we identify 
minor effects from the macroeconomic environment on business tax evasion: a 
significant effect of the business environment; as well a significant effect of social norms 
on noncompliance.  
This study contributes to the empirical literature on tax evasion by investigating 
the determinants of business tax evasion in transition countries and by its suggestions 
on model specification and estimation. However, this study is subject to two main 
limitations. The first is the lack of data on and consequent non-inclusion in the model 
both of the penalty element and of the probability of audit. Of course, the inability of 
transition countries to keep and publish data on these two factors limits any study. 
However, to the extent that that these variables are time invariant or “slowly changing” 
their influence is controlled for by the country fixed effects and thus is not a source of 
omitted variables bias. The second limitation is that the proxy for tax evasion is derived 
from a survey. Surveys of tax evasion are complicated, because evasion is a criminal 
activity and individuals are reluctant to admit such behaviour. Because of this, the data 
provided in surveys related to tax evasion are based on perceptions about the behaviour 
of others; therefore the outcomes are subjective and subject to measurement errors. 
Our findings suggest that in transitional economies institutional reform is the key 
to improving tax evasion. Additional institutional improvements could usefully include 
enhanced data collection. In particular, reporting data on penalties for evasion and audit 
practices would address one of the limitations of this study (and similar studies) noted 
above, and so better inform research and policy design.  
                                                 
20 We thank the anonymous referee for this suggestion. 
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